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Although feminist continental philosophy has explored the question of 
the body from different perspectives, it could be argued that it has yet to 
do justice to the materiality of the body (despite many attempts) or to give 
an account of sexual difference that does not marginalize the experiences 
of intersex and transgender people. Gayle Salamon’s book Assuming a Body 
addresses not only these issues, but also the often contentious divide between 
feminist and transgender communities. Through a series of readings drawn 
from both sides of the feminist-transgender divide, Salamon attempts to “enrich 
and broaden the mostly gender normative accounts of bodily materiality offered 
by psychoanalysis and phenomenology” as well as to “understand transgendered 
bodies as embodying a specificity that is finally not reducible to the material” 
(8). Over the course of seven chapters, she lays out an account of embodi-
ment drawn from psychoanalytic, phenomenological, transgender, and sexual 
difference theory that takes its materiality seriously without minimizing its 
ongoing implication in an open-ended and temporal process. In doing so, she 
tracks a notion of the “felt sense” of the body that she insists emerges from the 
unfolding meaning of an embodied subject who is inevitably entangled with 
the social and cultural production of normative gender and sex even when the 
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latter comes into tension with that subject’s felt sense of gendered and sexed 
embodiment.
Salamon contends that the lived experience of one’s embodiment has a 
history of its own. Just as feminist theory should engage the reality of trans-
gender lives more fully, transgender theory should avoid describing transgender 
identity as rooted in a “pure” experience of material reality; overlooking the 
history of how the “felt sense” of embodiment arises can shut down the produc-
tive reworkings of materiality that could ameliorate the lives of transpeople and 
open us all to a broader range of lived experience. Exploring the connections 
between feminist continental theory and trans-theory—the kind of exploration 
that Salamon engages in this book—could lead not only to such reworkings, 
but to an understanding of sexed and gendered identity that doesn’t reduce 
the transgendered subject to the “constitutive outside of binary gender” (98).
Although sympathetic to attempts, such as Jay Prosser’s in Second Skins, to 
counter the marginalization of transsexuality, especially in feminist and queer 
theory, by foregrounding the materiality of transgender lives and insisting that 
“the transsexual body is ‘unimpeachably real,’” Salamon argues in chapter 1 
that this kind of approach puts the transsexual body in a “domain of plenitude 
and fullness” that ultimately renders it beyond the realm of resignification. She 
contends that psychoanalytic approaches to the body, such as those of Jacques 
Lacan, Kaja Silverman, Didier Anzieu, Paul Schilder, and Judith Butler, as well 
as Sigmund Freud, have more promise for feminist and transgender theorists 
than attempts to ground identity by appeal to an ostensibly nondiscursive 
bodily materiality. The psychoanalytic theories she explores could be extended 
to overcome their binary bias in order to enable an affirmation of one’s mate-
riality through a reconfiguration and resignification of the lived meanings of 
those materialities: “To affirm a materiality—or, to be less abstract, to insist 
on the livability of one’s own embodiment, particularly when that embodi-
ment is culturally abject or socially despised—is to undertake a constant and 
always incomplete labor to reconfigure more than just the materiality of our 
own bodies. It is to strive to create and transform the lived meanings of those 
materialities” (42).
In chapter 2, Salamon presents a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
sexuality as the exemplar of transcendence; sexuality is a desiring relation 
to the other or the world in which my body becomes “the vehicle through 
which I am compelled into relation with the world, where it is finally only 
that relation that gives me a body” (56). This reaching out to the world entails 
a phantasmatic register that Merleau-Ponty reconfigures, “transforming it 
from a register characterized by a lack of materiality into a register character-
ized by an ungraspability” (61). That is, I take it, sexuality as the embodied 
reaching toward what transcends me opens me toward the kind of possibilities 
in resignification of the material that Salamon argued in her previous chapter 
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psychoanalytic theory could suggest; the phenomenological acknowledgment 
of temporality brings out the open-ended meaning of sexed, gendered, and 
desiring bodies that are always in relation in ways that exceed the binary 
categories of contemporary culture. Whereas for psychoanalysis “the body is 
available to a subject only through a complex set of mental representations, of 
psychic images, designated alternately as the bodily ego or the body schema” 
(4), Merleau-Ponty moves the capacities of the unconscious “from the domain 
of the mind to the domain of the body” (47). Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s account 
brings out a materialist way of understanding the unconscious that acknowl-
edges the role cultural meaning plays in our interpretations of the body without 
undermining the body’s materiality and our felt sense of that materiality; what 
exceeds the binary categories through which I live my gendered and sexed 
identity is my body as a process of relational desire that is always transcending 
those meanings.
In chapter 3, Salamon addresses various misconceptions of “social construc-
tion” theory and argues that at its best, social construction offers a way to 
understand how the felt sense of embodiment arises, “in all its historical and 
cultural variations, with all its urgency and immediacy” and asks “what it is, 
finally, that is delivered by that felt sense” (77). Salamon contends, in line with 
her critique of giving primacy to a nondiscursive bodily materiality presented in 
chapter 1, that the body severed from any psychic investments “has no meaning 
at all” (88). The “real” body, if taken in a phenomenological sense, can move us 
beyond a notion of the body as a “nonsocial material thing” (92) where what is 
real about it “confirms what we already know (about materiality, about gender, 
about itself)” and instead point us toward the capacity of the body “to exceed 
what we suppose about it. To be real, in this sense, is to hold one’s body and 
one’s self open to the possibilities of what one cannot know or anticipate in 
advance. It is to be situated at materiality’s threshold of possibility rather than 
caught within a materiality that is at its core constricted, constrictive, and 
determining” (92). Salamon thus builds upon the understanding of embodiment 
as a relation between the material and the phantasmatic developed through her 
readings of psychoanalytic and phenomenological theory in order to suggest 
that at the same time that our experience of embodiment is conditioned by 
social and cultural meaning, its materiality also always exceeds those meanings. 
Thus, although there is no nondiscursive materiality to which to appeal in 
order to counter normative conceptions of the body, we would do well to take 
the felt sense of embodiment of others seriously, perhaps especially when it 
challenges our own understanding of gender and sex: “Though it cannot fail to 
have meaning, the body’s morphology does not in any of these instances script 
either identification or desire, and those who understand bodily morphology 
to be constitutive of a truth that exceeds ideologies of gender would do well to 
take seriously some of the ways in which gender is currently being lived” (93).
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In chapter 4, Salamon considers the tense relations between women’s studies 
and trans studies and between queer theory and trans studies, and discusses 
the violence of some of the reactions to transgender initiatives. She expresses 
sympathy for “[Susan] Stryker’s observation that all gender trouble has now 
become consolidated under the sign of trans and that members of the gay and 
lesbian community, through that containment, are able to represent themselves 
to the public as ever more similar to heterosexuals, and thus safer” (106), and 
considers some of the dilemmas presented by confusing sexual orientation 
with gender identity. In order to perceive the ways in which sexual orientation 
and gender identity are mutually implicated, we need to consider how subjects 
possess not only a gender that “springs whole from an internally felt sense of 
self,” but also hope to receive recognition from others in terms of “the properly 
gendered name that the normative gender configurations of the social world 
conspire to withhold” (125). My gender identity “has a social life that exceeds 
my own” (123), in the sense that I need to negotiate processes of naming and 
categorization that may challenge or contradict my felt sense of embodiment. 
The violent reaction of even feminist and gay and lesbian communities to trans 
troubling of gender identity may speak to anxieties about how to engage in 
such negotiations.
In chapters 5 and 6, Salamon investigates Luce Irigaray’s and Elizabeth 
Grosz’s accounts of sexual difference in order to argue that if we go beyond 
the irreducible difference posited by both, in which “transsexuality becomes 
the constitutive outside of sexual difference” (168), we could move toward a 
notion of sexual difference inclusive of transgender experience that “need not 
be located at the level of sex at all” (168). The kind of negotiation of difference 
manifest in the trans body allows us to go beyond an understanding of the 
traversal of sexual boundaries that would posit it as an unrepresentable breach. 
Salamon’s final chapter corroborates this challenge to an irreducibly binary 
understanding of sexual difference by undermining sex as the anchor for sexual 
difference. Her characterization of the multiple ways that documents of the 
state come into play in the transition from one sex to another suggests that 
“sex is assigned rather than discovered, interpreted even as it is documented,” 
and thus challenges the notion that “gender may travel, but sex is firm ground” 
(190). If sex is more a matter of a series of officially sanctioned documents 
attesting to one’s sex than a fixed category, then even sex cannot ground gender 
identity (or transitions from one side of sexual difference to the other). “If 
we are to give difference its due as a vital force, as Irigaray invites us to, we 
must also acknowledge that femininity is compossible with the category of 
male, that the masculinity expressed within some iterations of femaleness is 
as ontologically robust as any other kind of masculinity” (144).
Salamon’s attempt to bridge the contentious gap between feminist 
continental philosophy and trans studies is both welcome and provocative. 
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Her readings set up juxtapositions that invite further exploration and I found 
her argument that we need to overcome resistances on both sides in order 
to foster productive collaboration entirely persuasive. While I recommend 
her book to anyone interested in questions about subjectivity pertinent to our 
contemporary situation, it is not a book I would recommend for a theoretically 
unsophisticated audience (for example, undergraduates). Some of her readings 
of specific theoretical texts are quite difficult and seem somewhat disjointed 
from the attempt to render them accessible to the life problems posed by being 
transgender. In addition, the book as a whole has a fragmented quality that 
may speak to the difficulty of the topic as well as the previous existence of some 
of the chapters as stand-alone articles. I would have liked to have seen more 
integration of the chapters and a clearer account drawn out of her readings of 
how we might give difference its due at the same time that we recognize the 
need to negotiate the normative gender categories of social life as well as honor 
a felt sense of embodiment that may be in tension with those categories. As a 
preliminary exploration of some possible directions, however, this collection of 
essays, if not quite jelled into a definitive statement, is an important resource 
and instigation for future work along some very promising lines of thought.
—Swarthmore College
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